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COMMENT
Criminal Procedure: The Fourth Amendment Collides
with the Problem of Child Pornography and the Internet
He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy
from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent
that will reach to himself.'
L Introduction
For modem individuals, cyberspace is the "new frontier." Increasingly, it has
become the realm in which business is conducted, friendships are cultivated, and
information is exchanged. Unlike all other uncharted territories, however, cyberspace
has no physical geography; no territorial boundaries exist. Largely for this reason,
traditional legal doctrines appear ill equipped to deal with contemporary problems that
originate in cyberspace. In all likelihood, the immensity and rapid growth of
cyberspace has already outstripped the ability of the law to keep pace Only through
careful legislative initiatives and restrained judicial decision making can the law prove
fit for dealing with the challenges created by cyberspace's information explosion.
Modem American society is robed in the Constitution and steeped in the rule of
law. This should remain the state of affairs. However, sweeping technological
advances often force the law to adapt. Communication via cyberspace has spurred
some of the most dramatic societal changes in history. Today, estimates of Internet
usage stand at about 67.5 million persons worldwide.3 By the year 2003, researchers
expect that there will be roughly 350 million Internet users.4
The exponential growth in the Internet user population underscores the sense of
urgency with which those in the legal community must approach the law's ability to
respond to future Internet problems. Concerns over the proper legal analysis to apply
to issues of jurisdiction, privacy, and intellectual property are gaining increasing
attention, as scholars and courts alike grapple with the prolific demands created by
cyberspace.5
1. Thomas Paine, Dissertation of First Principles of Government, in 2 THE COMPLEM WRITINGS
OF THOMAS PAINE 588 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1945).
2. See Anne M. Fulton, Cyberspace and the Internet: Who Will Be the Privacy Police?, 3
CoMMLAw CoNsPEcrus 63, 64 (1995).
3. See Viruses' Economic Drain, PC MAG., Sept. 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 6782125.
4. See Phil Harvey, LookSmart Promises to Clean Up the Clutter on the Internet, UPSIDE
MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 1999, at 71, 71.
5. See generally Randolph S. Sergent, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and
Data Privacy, 81 VA. L. REv. 1181 (1995).
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Like all other areas, criminal law must adapt to keep pace with advancing
technology. Dealing with eyber-crime presents particularly difficult problems, in part
because the choices which are made there can affect so many other areas of law.
This comment explores the uneasy application of the United States Constitution's
Fourth Amendment search and seizure law to Internet crimes. This comment frames
the analysis within the problem of child pornography. Part HI provides a general
introduction to the problem of child pornography on the Internet. Part III provides an
overview of attempts by_ Congress to combat child pornography by statute, and
recognizes the problem of statutory construction, which courts face. Additionally, Part
I highlights law enforcement efforts at both the domestic and international level. Part
IV discusses the Fourth Amendment and its application to Internet communications
generally: Part V addresses the Tenth Circuit's attempt to apply Fourth Amendment
analysis to electronic communications. Part VI pays tribute to the privacy concerns
at stake in the context of Internet searches. Finally, this comment proposes that
existing Fourth Amendment analysis can survive the societal transformation
attributable to the rise of the Internet if the legal community makes a concerted effort
to understand all that is at stake.
II. The Problem: Child Pornography on the Internet
The market for child pornography, unfortunately, is not new. Before computers,
trading child pornography was a more personal endeavor. Consumers of child
pornography either had to know each other or seek out an underground network that
exchanged pictures and videos through the mail or in person. Thus, access to child
pornography was limited. However, the advent of the Internet and the increasing
sophistication of computer technology in general has allowed distributors and
consumers of child pornography to become more organized. The new medium has
facilitated communication, making child pornography a global industry.7
Commentators note a number of reasons for the proliferation of child pornography
on the Internet.8 First, pornographic material depicting children in sexual situations
is easily accessible on the Internet;9 if one has a computer and is connected to the
Internet, one has access to child pornography. " For example, traders in child
pornography can visit electronic shops, browse through pornographic images, use their
credit cards to purchase images they want and download their selections to either their
hard drive or a floppy disk." There are also private networks where pedophiles share
sordid stories of abuse and swap pornographic pictures. " Also, electronic "chat
6. See Jennifer Stewart, If This Is the Global Community, We Must Be on the Bad Side of Town:
International Policing of Child Pornography on the Internet, 20 Hous. J. IN 'L LAW 205, 213 (1997).
7. See i at 212; see also Lesli C. Esposito, Note, Regulating the Internet: The New Battle Against
Child Pornography, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 541, 542 (1998).
8. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 211.
9. See id. at 213.
10. See id.
11. See John Henley, The Observer Campaign to Clean Up the Internet: Hackers Called in as
Cybercops to Drive Out Porn, OBSERVER, Sept. I, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12065705.
12. See id.
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groups" provide easy access where child "pornography can be exchanged more or less
anonymously."'"
Second, advances in computer technology have increased the ability to produce
child pornography.' Traders in child pornography can use computer scanners to
input images onto the Internet from other sources."5 Additionally, "video-capture"
devices exist, which can pick up a still frame from the television, video camera, or
VCR and input the image into the computer. 6 Similarly, one can use computer video
cameras to record "live action," allowing full color video and sound to be recorded
and transmitted via the Internet. 7 Similarly, much of the child pornography found
on, or traced through, the Internet has come to be called "virtual child por-
nography."'8 Virtual pornography takes many different forms. At one end of the
spectrum, an image is created entirely without the use of an actual child.' Other
virtual images are composed of numerous pictures of adults and children morphedt'
together.2'
Additional technological advances have revolutionized the distribution of child
pornography." Consumers and dealers of child pornography can exchange material
on floppy disks or through the Internet, as opposed to using the mail or meeting in
person The quality of digital images on the Internet is also superior to and lasts
longer than photographs.' The Internet has made it possible to "mass market" child
pornography with virtually no overhead, thus increasing consumer demand for the
material.'
Third, the Internet provides anonymity.? For example, a person can establish a
bulletin board, and use it to exchange sexual interests in children, without a license
or registration.' Additionally, while commercial online service providers use adults
-o monitor online discussions, news groups and chat groups with the "alt" prefix are
usually not regulated in this wayU A person can reroute e-mail and graphic images
13. Stewart, supra note 6, at 213.
14. See id. at 213-14.
15. See iaL These scanners change photographic images into digital form, which may then be saved
as files on a computer hard drive or floppy disk. Id at 214.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography: A Constitutional
Question, 34 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 439, 440-41 (1997).
19. See id. at 440.
20. "Morphing," also known as "metamorphosing," is a process that allows a computer to fill in the
area between dissimilar objects in order to produce a combined image. See id. at 440 n.5.
21. See Wendy L. Pursel, Computer-Generated Child Pornography: A Legal Alternative?, 22
SEATrLE L. REv. 643, 644 (1998).
22. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 213.
23. See id,
24. See id. at 214.
25. See id. at 214-15.
26. See id. at 215.
27. See id,
28. See Mark Clayton, "Off-Line" Hazards Lie in Web's Links, Lures, CHRISTAN SCI. MONITOR,
Aug. 29, 1996, at 10. The "alt" prefix designates a newsgroup as alternative and unofficial. See also
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through multiple nations so that the origin of the file is virtually undetectable."
Further, Internet users commonly use nicknames or aliases, which make it more
difficult for authorities to identify them.
With the ascendancy of a now global child pornography industry, largely
attributable to increasing Internet use, the criminal law has had to be expanded in
some areas and readapted in others. As the balance of this comment seeks to illustrate,
this situation has created challenges both for legislators and the courts as well as law
enforcement officials.
IlL. Attempts to Combat the Problem
The legislative and executive branches of the United States government have
grappled with methods of apprehending and convicting individuals who create or
disseminate child pornography on the InternetO Effectively combating Internet crime
requires the coordination of local, national, and international resources. This section
explores the development of laws aimed at eradicating child pornography. Additional-
ly, this section examines specific law enforcement methods used to identify, apprehend
and prosecute persons engaged in the exchange of child pornography over the Internet.
Finally, brief attention is dedicated to the international community's response to the
problem of child pornography.
A. Statutory Response
Criminalization of the possession and distribution of child pornography in the
United States has been evolving over several decades. Early legislative initiatives were
ineffective in dealing with the problem of child pornography in the context of
computer technology. The Federal Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation
Act, enacted in 1978, prohibited the production of "sexually explicit" material using
a child under the age of sixteen, if such material will travel or has traveled in
interstate commerce' However, because this law reached only the commercial
exchange of child pornography, it did not prohibit trading or giving away the material,
even if sent through the United States mail." To correct this problem, Congress
passed the Child Protection Act (CPA) in 1984, eliminating the requirement of a
commercial transaction? The CPA recognized an earlier decision by the Supreme
JOHN R. LEVINE Er AL., THE INTERNET FOR DUMMIEs 218, 225 (5th ed. 1998) (recognizing that some
Internet users take advantage of the anonymity and lack of regulation).
29. See LEVINE, supra note 28, at 224.
30. In 1999, President Clinton issued an executive order establishing a working group to address
unlawful conduct, including child pornography, involving the use of the Internet. See Exec. Order No.
13,133, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,895 (1999).
31. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-225, § 2252(a),
92 Stat. 7, 7-8 (1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994)).
32. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEPTr OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT
67, 133 (1986).
33. See Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, § 4,98 Stat. 204,204-05 (1986) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994)). Additionally, the 1984 Act changed the definition of a minor
to a person under the age of eighteen. See id.
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Court in New York v. Ferber,' which made obsolete the obscenity test previously
announced by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California,5 at least in the context of
child pornography. Finally, in 1986 Congress passed the Child Sexual Abuse Act,
which banned the production and use of advertisements for child pornography.'
Congress first addressed the problem of the relationship between child pornography
and computer technology with the enactment of the Child Protection and Obscenity
Enforcement Act of 1988.?' This law criminalizes the use of computers to transmit
advertisements for, or visual depictions of, child pornography.38 However, as
computer technology rapidly evolved, this statute became less effective. Early
legislative prohibitions against child pornography in the United States were aimed at
addressing the harm done to children by the production and distribution of por-
nographic material. 9 Consequently, these statutes utterly failed to recognize that
pornographic images could be digitally created without actually involving children.'
To correct this and other weaknesses, Congress enacted the Child Pornography
Protection Act (CPPA) in 1996.!' For the first time, federal law defined child
pornography to include "computer" or "computer-generated image(s) or picture(s)" of
minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.42
Although the CPPA provides a stronger legal basis for the conviction of those
exchanging child pornography on the Internet, commentators and courts alike have
found problems with the Act. At least one court has ruled that the statute is
"impermissibly vague and overbroad."43 In United States v. Hilton, the defendant was
34. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
35. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). In Miller, the Court held that pornography found to be obscene by
contemporary community standards, does not enjoy the protection of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at
36. Essentially, the Miller test for determining obscenity is: (a) whether "the average person applying
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value, Id. at 24. In Ferber, the Court found that the Miller obscenity standard did
not apply to child pornography because child pornography is per se obscene. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at
755-56.
36. Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 2, 100 Stat. 3510,
3510-11 (1989) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c) (1994)).
37. Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7511-7513,
102 Stat. 4485, 4485-87 (1990) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(c), 2252(a), 2256, 2251A (1994)).
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)-(2).
39. See David J. Loundy, Who Hasn't Noticed? Child Porn Already Illegal, 144 CHI. DAILY L.
BuLL., May 14, 1998, available in Westlaw, 5/14198 CHIDLB 6.
40. See id.
41. See Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110
Stat.) 26 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (1994)).
42. ld.
43. United States v. Hilton, 999 F. Supp. 131, 137 (D. Me. 1998), rev'd, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir.
1999). The United States Supreme Court has held that a statute which is impermissibly vague is
unconstitutional because such a malady may inhibit the exercise of the freedoms protected by the First
Amendment. See id. at 135 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972). To avoid
being deemed "vague," a statute must "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage
20001
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charged with possessing child pornography. He moved to dismiss the charges brought
against him under the CPPA, claiming that the statute violated his First Amendment
rights." The defendant argued that section 2256(a)(5)(B) of the CPPA, in conjunction
with the definition of child pornography set forth in section 2256(8)(B) 4' did not
clearly identify the prohibited conduct. More specifically, he argued that the definition
of "child pornography," which includes visual depictions that appear to be of minors
engaged in sexually explicit conduct, is too subjective to enable ordinary people to
know what conduct is prohibited.
The Hilton court applied the doctrines of "vagueness" and "overbreadth,"
emphasizing that a statute suffering either malady inhibits the exercise of freedom of
speech protected by the First Amendment and is therefore unconstitutional. 47 In order
to avoid being characterized as impermissibly vague, a statute must "define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement."' The court concluded that "[t]he CPPA's definition of
'child pornography' creates substantial uncertainty for viewers presented with materials
depicting post-pubescent individuals, for the determination as to whether those
individuals have yet reached eighteen years of age will often not be easy or clear."'
Additionally, the court noted that the classification of computer generated images
according to this subjective standard would be equally difficult.' For these reasons,
the court struck down the statute as unconstitutionally vague.5'
The Hilton court also embraced the defendant's claim that the statute was
impermissibly overbroad, noting that a statute may be overbroad if it encompasses
conduct that is constitutionally protected.e The court found that the definition of
"minor" under the statute, together with its role in defining "child pornography," may
impact a large amount of adult pornography featuring youthful looking adults."
Because the statute's subjective language would chill expression involving adults, the
court held that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad.'
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
Additionally, if a statute prohibits constitutionally protected conduct, it may be deemed overbroad as
well. See id. (citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114). However, a statute regulating expressive conduct will
not be rendered unconstitutional unless its overbreadth is not only "real but sustainable as well." Id. at
137 (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)).
44. See id. at 132.
45. Section 2256(8)(B) defines "child pornography" as including visual depictions which "appear
to be of a mintr" as well as those which are of a minor. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B).
46. See Hilton, 999 F. Supp. at 136.
47. See id. at 135.
48. Id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
49. hi. at 136.
50. See i.
51. See i.d
52. "[W]here a statute regulates expressive conduct, the scope of the statute does not render it
unconstitutional unless its' overbreadth is not only real, but substantial as well ... ." Id. (citing Osborne
v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990)).
53. See i.d at 137.
54. See id.
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The approach to the CPPA asserted in Hilton does not enjoy universal support. 5
In fact, the First Circuit has since overruled the decision.' However, the case serves
as an illustration of the unique problem of statutory construction, which courts face
in attempting to strike a just balance between maintaining constitutional protection of
speech and combating the problem of child pornography.
Commentators in the legal community have also waged a fervent attack on the
CPPA. One observer charges the CPPA with being "reactionary legislation, passed in
the name of regulating the electronic frontier" with its primary function being to
threaten constitutional rights. Another applauded the result reached by the lower
Hilton court, stating that laws in existence prior to the CPPA were sufficient to
prevent the harm caused by the distribution of child pornography online.58
B. Law Enforcement Efforts
Law enforcement activities directed at the problem of child pornography on the
Internet take several different forms. Wiretapping and tips from informants are
utilized, as are subpoenaed records of online transmissions from Internet service
providers (ISPs)."9 Currently, the most widely used method to track and apprehend
traders in child pornography is undercover activity by law enforcement.'
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's "Innocent Images" initiative involves
coordinating nationwide undercover investigations of child pornographers' Innocent
Images grew out of a 1995 investigation into the disappearance of a ten-year-old
boy. Inquiry into two suspects linked to the boy's disappearance revealed that the
suspects as well as other adults were routinely using computers both to transmit
images of minors showing frontal nudity or sexually explicit conduct and to lure
minors into sexual activities.' To identify those individuals who are victimizing
children, the FBI formed a task force composed of FBI agents and other federal, state,
and local investigators who go online in an undercover capacity, posing as either
55. See Loundy, supra note 39.
56. See United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 77 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding the CPPA to be neither
unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad because the statute targets only a narrow class of images and the
ordinary consumer of sexually explicit materials is given adequate notice of the kinds of images to
avoid).
57. Loundy, supra note 39.
58. See Brenda M. Simon, First Amendment Internet Crime Statutes: Child Pornography. United
States v. Hilton, 14 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 385, 401 (1999).
59. See Michael Grunwald, Global Internet Child Porn Ring Uncovered, WVASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1998,
at A12, available in 1998 WL 16553624.
60. See id See United States v. Wilson, 182 F.3d 737, 739 (10th Cir. 1999), United States v. Katz,
178 F.3d 368, 369 (5th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 533 (1st Cir. 1999), as
examples of the use of undercover agents to apprehend child pornographers who use the Internet.
61. See Proliferation of Child Pornography on the Internet: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. 1 (1998) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, FBI).
62. See id (discussing the disappearance of George Stanley Burdynski, Jr., in Prince George's
County, Maryland).
63. See id.
200
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young children or as sexual predators.' In 1998, the FBI reported that its Innocent
Images investigation had generated 184 convictions since its inception.'
Although undercover detection appears to have been effective thus far, as child
pornographers become more savvy over time, the method will likely wane in its
effectiveness. Of course, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances that would make
undercover operations obsolete. Given the annual increase in funding to such
programs, it is unlikely that the FBI will ever abandon the method.
The FBI has also introduced efforts to limit the use of encryption technology as a
method of tracking perpetrators of Internet crimes, including child pornographers.
This has spurred a heated debate evident in both legal scholarship and the writings of
public action groups, which fear the privacy implications that such limits could
have.67 As one scholar explains, the study of encryption, or cryptography, is an
obscure field of mathematics in which individuals make and break codes using
mathematical algorithms. ' A cryptosystem is a collection of algorithms that enables
an individual to encrypt a message by transforming it from its original form into an
undecipherable one." An individual who later receives the message will be unable
to read it without first decrypting the message."
The technical details of the various types of cryptographic systems are very
complex and beyond the scope of this comment. However, the practical uses of
encryption are important to note. Businesses, banks, and the government are the most
dominant users of encryption technology for obvious reasons' Safeguarding trade
secrets, financial records, and information relating to the nation's security are all good
reasons to allow the encryption of computer data n Along those same lines,
individuals also have an interest in keeping various aspects of their lives shielded from
the public at large. But some argue that allowing everyone to use encryption protects
criminals from being detected.' Others passionately support the right of all
individuals to have access to the best encryption technology.74 In other words, in an
64. See id.
65. See id. (noting that since March 1997 the number of search warrants executed increased 62%,
the number of indictment increased 50%, and the numbers of arrests and convictions increased 57% and
45% respectively).
66. See id. (reporting on the problem of sexual predators who use encryption and the need of law
enforcement to have access to such files and the technology to decode them).
67. See Bill Pietrucha, ACLU Calls Encryption Actions Nightmare For Privacy, NEwsaYTFS NEWs
NETWORK, Sept. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13910671 (asserting that the FBI is demanding "a front
door key to every American's house, just in case a criminal happens to be hiding out somewhere").
68. See Kenneth P. Weinberg, Cryptography: "Key Recovery" Shaping Cyberspace (Pragmatism
and Theory), 5 J. INTELL PROP. 667, 673 (1998) (explaining that an algorithm may be used to transform
information from "plaintext" to "cyphertext" and visa versa).
69. See id. at 674.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 676-79.
72. See id. at 676.
73. See id. at 681.
74. See generally Americans for Computer Privacy (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <httpl//www.
computerprivacy.org>.
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open, democratic society, the rights of the individual sometimes supersede those of
society at large.
The success of law enforcement officials at both the state and federal; levels in
tracking and apprehending the consumers and traders of child pornography will depend
greatly on their ability to stay up-to-date with the rapid advancement of computer
technology. However, the efficacy of law enforcement also hinges on the license
given them by legislation and judicial decisions.
C. The International Arena
At the international level there is no formal treaty that establishes an obligation
between nations to pursue child pornographers. However, due to the near universal
desire to protect children, there is a significant degree of international cooperation.
The rise of Internet use, not surprisingly, runs concomitant to the intensification of
cooperative efforts. Illustrative of this fact is the recent raid on roughly two hundred
suspected members of an Internet child pornography ring, which called themselves the
"Wonderland Club."'76 The sweeps were conducted simultaneously on targets in the
United States, Australia, and twelve European countries based on evidence collected
and shared by law enforcement officials in those countries.'
Aside from the cooperation of domestic law enforcement at the international level,
certain international organizations and commercial enterprises have enlisted in the
battle against child pornography.7 Interpol (International Criminal Police Or-
ganization)' actively promotes the detection and conviction of those who engage in
the sexual exploitation of children."
Some efforts have been made to encourage self-censorship by Internet service
providers (ISPs).!1 ISPs can simply refuse to sell space to anyone they know to be
providing child pornography. s In the United States, it is unlikely that this option will
succeed, largely because of federal legislation that relieves ISPs from liability.'
Ironically, at least one court has ruled that a server which takes on the responsibility
of self-regulation may be subjected to even greater liability if it falls short of this
endeavor.' However, the trend in other nations seems different'
75. However, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which entered into force
in 1990, defines as a part of international law universal children's rights and specifically addresses child
pornography. Under the Convention, all state Parties are required to "take all appropriate national,
bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent... (c) the exploitative use of children in pornographic
performances and materials." See Esposito, supra note 7, at 59-61 (citing Convention on the Rights of
the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/441736 (1989)).
76. See Grunwald, supra note 59, at A12.
77. See id. (listing the countries involved in the operation and describing the procedures used).
78. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 228-29.
79. See id. at 229.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 230.
82. See id.
83. Communications Decency Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. III 1997). The Communications
Decency Act (CDA) states that no person shall be liable for violating the Act "solely for providing access
or connection to or from a facility, system or network not under that person's control." Id. § 223(e)(1).
84. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (N.Y.
20001
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Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which act at the international level, are
also fighting the battle against child pornography. These groups exist for various
reasons ranging from commercial to humanitarian and political." One NGO has
directed its efforts towards detecting pedophiles and child pornographers on the
Internet by establishing a "cybercop" unit made up of undercover agents who police
the Internet.!
Inherent to the goal of pursuing child pornographers who use the Internet to
exchange their wares is the need for cooperation on the international level. 9
Hopefully, efforts by the various bodies will continue to develop efficacious methods
to deal with the problem while keeping an eye on democratic values. The interest of
the international community in apprehending child pornographers must be carefully
balanced against the rights individuals enjoy in a democratic society. The respective
states should come together with an understanding of their differences on such issues
as privacy and freedom of speech. They must thoughtfully choose when compromises
on such issues should and should not be made.
IV. Fourth Amendment Analysis - Responding to the Internet
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government and sets forth guidelines for
granting search warrants:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized'
In order to determine whether the reasonableness and warrant requirements of the
Fourth Amendment apply to communications, it is first necessary to decide whether the
inspection of such communications constitutes a "search." The task of defining
App. Div. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute as stated in Zeran v. America On Line, Inc., 129 F.3d
327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that 47 U.S.C. § 230 immunizes Internet service providers like AOL
from liability for information that originates with third parties). The case revolved around an action for
libel based on statements posted on a Prodigy bulletin board. The court found that since Prodigy "held
itself out as an on-line service that exercised editorial control over the content of messages posted on its
computer bulletin boards," it exposed itself to greater liability than other computer networks that made
no such choice. Id. Ultimately, the court entered summary judgement for the plaintiffs.
85. In 1998, a Bavarian judge sentenced the former head of Compuserve Deutschland to two years
injail for distributing pornography involving animals and children since such material could be accessed
via the Compuserve server. See Alan Cowell, Head of German Web Sentenced for Pornography, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 1998, at Al.
86. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 234.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 235 (speaking of Norwegian Save the Children).
89. Of course, this is true of the general need to regulate all Internet crimes. See generally Michael
Hatcher et al., Computer Crimes, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 397 (1999).
90. U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
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government action as a search, and thus subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny, has
largely been guided by Supreme Court decisions 9 If government conduct constitutes
a search, then it must be reasonable and pursuant to a valid warrant, barring an
exception outlined infra."
This section will chart the evolution of Fourth Amendment analysis as it highlights
the law's response to social, political, and most importantly, technological change. What
emerges from this review is troubling. Modern Fourth Amendment principles and
guidelines are in many ways obsolete when superimposed over the computer data
medium.
A. Background to Current Fourth Amendment Analysis
Throughout the earlier part of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court applied what
some term a "property-based" standard when dealing with Fourth Amendment
questions 3 In Boyd v. United States," recognized as the Court's first significant
examination of the Fourth Amendment, the protection of property was found to lie at
the heart of the Amendment." In Boyd, a contracting firm was accused of claiming
more cases of plate glass as exempt from customs duties than the firm had actually
used. The issue facing the Court was whether the government could subpoena the
firm's papers to use against the firm. Justice Bradley, writing for the majority, found
that the protection of an individual's property interest served to restrict "all invasions
on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life."' Thus, the Court found that the firm alone was entitled to
possess the papers that the government sought, because the papers were the property
of the firm 8 Essentially, the Court found that an individual's private property interest
outweighed the government's interest in prosecuting a crime."
While this property-based paradigm survived for more than half a century, later
decisions retreated from the absolute protection of property principle set forth in Boyd.
Instead, the Supreme Court began to carve out a variety of "constitutionally protected
area[s]."'(D This view of the Fourth Amendment permitted government agents to
inspect any unprotected area without a warrant or probable cause. However, excluding
91. See infra text accompanying notes 93-106.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 180-191.
93. See Michael Adler, Cyberspace. General Searches, and Digital Contraband: The Fourth
Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE LJ. 1093, 1101-02 (1996).
94. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
95. See Adler, supra note 93, at 1101; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.1, at 105 (2d Student ed. 1992).
96. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 618.
97. Id. at 630.
98. See id. at 631.
99. See id. at 631-32.
100. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (holding that an "open field" was not a
constitutionally protected area); see also Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962) (finding that
house, office, store, hotel room, and car were "protected areas" but that visitors' room of a jail was not).
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a "few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions,"'' official intrusion into
a protected area required a warrant supported by probable cause.
.The area-based model of Fourth Amendment analysis was applied in Olmstead v.
United States,"° where the Supreme Court addressed the necessity of a search warrant
in the context of a wire tap." In Olmstead, the Court held that using a wire tap to
eavesdrop on phone conversations was not a "search" where the wires actually tapped
were not a part of the defendant's home or office."
To some, the Olmstead decision represents the inadequacy of the area-based
approach to Fourth Amendment analysis in the context of electronic com-
munications." For example, one author examines the prospect of a "net-wide" search
by government officials whereby a program could scan through millions of files,
unbeknownst to computer owners, and report to the authorities the presence of only
illegal files." How would such an intrusion be characterized? A physical entrance
into the home or business is not involved, but it seems that most observers would view
the search program as an intrusion, even if illegal files were not discovered on their
computers. However, under Olmstead, it is unclear how a court would rule. On the one
hand, a court could find that the search program was not a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes because the government did not physically enter the home or
office; the government was merely eavesdropping using a device installed on a
government computer in a distant city. On the other hand, a court could view the
government action as more intrusive than that in Olmstead, and find that a search
occurred, reasoning that the program essentially entered a person's home or office
through their computer. This hypothetical illustrates the conceptual difficulties involved
when attempting to apply outdated legal principles to new technology. The Supreme
Court's subsequent rejection of Olmstead" was largely due to new ideas regarding
the individual and technology, and therefore illustrates how, at its best, the law evolves
to fit current circumstances. 1w
B. Modern Fourth Amendment Analysis and Its General Application to Computer
Communications
1. Private Searches Are Not Protected
As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognize that the Fourth Amendment
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government."w Searches
101. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
102. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
103. See Sergent, supra note 5, at 1186.
104. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464-65.
105. See Sergent, supra note 5, at 1187.
106. See generally Adler, supra note 93.
107. The Supreme Court later "conclude[d] that the underpinnings of Olmstead have been so eroded
by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as
controlling." Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
108. See Sergent, supra note 5, at 1186 (explaining that Olm0tead "is a prime example of the
inadequacy of the area-based approach for a society dependant upon electronic communications").
109. See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 95, § 3.2, at 117-18.
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and seizures by private citizens or nongovemment actors may-form the basis for
redress, but it will not likely give rise to Fourth Amendment protection. The exception
to this general rule is where a private entity acts as a government agent."' Deter-
mining whether a private individual is acting on behalf of the government involves
answering several questions. First, did the government know about and encourage the
intrusive conduct? Second, did the private actor intend to assist the efforts of law
enforcement by conducting the search or was it to further his own ends? Third, did the
government offer the private actor some type of reward?"'
The courts have addressed the "private search" in the context of computer
communication. In United States v. Hall,", the defendant took his computer to a
repair service. A repairman viewed various files containing images of children engaging
in sexually explicit acts. He then copied the incriminating files to a disk and helped law
enforcement pursue the defendant. In Hall, the court held that the search conducted by
the repairman was not covered by the Fourth Amendment; it was a private search."'
In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that the search by the repairman was
conducted pursuant to the maintenance work done in his position as employee.""
Additionally, the government did not know the repairman would repair the defendant's
computer, so it could not have instructed him to inspect the computer files."5
2. The "Reasonable Expectations" Test
In Katz v. United States,"' the Supreme Court established the current approach to
Fourth Amendment analysis. In Katz, the Court held that a "search" was within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when government electronically listened to and
recorded the defendant's words spoken into a telephone receiver inside a public
telephone booth because these actions violated the defendant's privacy on which he
justifiably relied."7 Furthermore, the fact that the electronic device used by the
government did not penetrate the wall of the phone booth had no constitutional
significance whatsoever."' Since Katz, the Court focuses on an individual's "expe-
ctations of privacy" with respect to the area or object that was searched. Most
importantly, Katz emphasized that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places." ' Justice Harlan's concurring opinion became the basis for the Supreme
Court's current two-part test to determine whether a given government inspection
constitutes a search.": First, the Court must determine whether government action
110. See id. at 118.
111. See id.; see also United States v. McAllister, 18 F.3d 1412, 1417 (7th Cir. 1994).
112. 142 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 1998).
113. See id at 993.
114. See id
115. See id.
116. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
117. See id. at 353.
118. See id at 356-57.
119. Id. at 351. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52.
120. See id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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violated an individual's subjective expectation of privacy.' Second, if society
recognizes that expectation as reasonable, then the inspection is a search and the
protections of the Fourth Amendment apply.'"
The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test is composed of both an objective and
subjective prong. Consequently, the two-part test has been criticized as difficult to
apply- The subjective element of the test has been attacked because relying on a
subjective notion of what is "private" can easily be defeated by an announcement by
the government that something is not private." In other words, as the great architect
of the test himself said, "[o]ur expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part
reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and
present."'"m Perhaps because of this difficulty in application, the subjective prong has
received little, if any, attention in the analysis of Fourth Amendment issues. Subjective
notions of whether various forms of computer data are private will vary depending on
the degree of an individual's technical knowledge. Often, the level of one's knowledge
about computer data will be inversely related to their expectation of privacy in that data.
Similarly, the objective reasonableness prong of the Katz test has also been subjected
to criticism. It has been suggested that a determination of objective reasonableness
ultimately rests on a "value judgement" or a determination of how much privacy we,
as a society, should enjoy. m  Determining whether an individual's expectation of
privacy in computer data is objectively reasonable is quite troubling. How much does
society actually know about the vulnerability of Internet transmissions and computer
files to being searched or intercepted? The answer is that it varies so greatly among
persons that an objective measure is virtually impossible to conceptualize. Although
some may argue that this difficulty exists in other contexts as well, such a shortcoming
significantly affects the lives of real people, and thus should not be blindly accepted.Due to the difficulty in applying the Katz test to computer information, courts often
turn to earlier notions of privacy and have attempted to draw analogies to the new
medium; thus, it is helpful to revisit some of these earlier applications. The
Supreme Court has held that the following activities do not constitute searches under
the Fourth Amendment: canine sniffs of cars or luggage, using electronic beepers
to track vehicles," subpoenaing bank records, m using undercover agents, 3' flying
over residential property,' using a pen register to record numbers dialed on a
121. See id
122. See id
123. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 95, § 3.2. at 125.
124. See id at 126.
125. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
126. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349,
403 (1974).
127. See infra text accompanying notes 138-141.
128. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). However, some states have granted
greater protection under state constitutions. See, e.g., State v. Pellici, 580 A.2d 710, 716 (N.H. 1990).
129. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S 276, 285 (1983).
130. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441-43 (1976).
131. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
132. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989); see also California v. Cimolo, 476 U.S. 207,
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telephone," and rummaging through trash discarded at the curb for pickup."34 Since
these actions by law enforcement officials do not constitute searches, the protections of
the Fourth Amendment do not apply. Law enforcement need not acquire a warrant to
engage in these activities.
Conversely, courts have held other governmental actions clearly to be searches and
thus protected by the Fourth Amendment. Generally, the use of electronic eavesdrop-
ping or wiretapping equipment are considered "searches," as are unconsented entrances
into residential units.'35 Along this same vein, areas close to one's house (or "inside
the curtilage") are also protected.' " Individuals also retain a reasonable expectation
of privacy in sealed first-class mail sent through the postal system."
Analogies to these earlier notions of privacy are abundant in recent case law
regarding computer technology. For example, in United States v. Maxwell," the court
equated an e-mail message with first-class mail and telephone conversations. 3' The
court reasoned that in the cases of both first-class mail and telephone conversations, a
party relies on an intermediary (either the post office or the telephone company) to
relay the message to the recipient; however, a party maintains an expectation of privacy
in the content of the message.'" Similarly, the sender of e-mail relies on a service to
deliver the message to the intended recipient, yet he retains an expectation of privacy
in the content of the message. 4' Maxwell is illustrative of the emerging "analogical
method." Since lawyers, judges, and legal scholars will play a role in developing the
law in this area, they should cooperate to ensure that well reasoned, deliberate decisions
are made when comparing situations involving computer technology to those earlier
instances. Furthermore, if there is no analogy that "fits" in a particular case, lawyers,
judges, and legal scholars must be willing to develop new applications of the
"expectations test."
In addition to analogizing, courts applying the Fourth Amendment "expectations test"
to cyberspace communications may rely on one of several analytical models. For
example, one commentator notes that the nature of the system on which the particular
communication is found should be a factor.'" In other words, courts should look at
whether a computer is a single user PC located in a private home, a multiuser system
found in an office, or a public system maintained by a library or university."
Recently, in a trial of a Chicago man charged with possession of child pornography
with intent to distribute, prosecutors argued that the defendant's e-mail proved his intent
213-14 (1986).
133. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
134. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988).
135. See LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 95, § 3.2, at 128-30.
136. See id. at 131-32.
137. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
138. 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
139. See id. at 417.
140. See id. at 417-18.
141. See id.
142. See generally Sergent, supra note 5.
143. See id.
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to distribute.'" In response, the defense attorney pointed to the fact that others had
access to defendant's computer and could have easily written the incriminating e-
mail.'4 While the e-mails were permitted as evidence at trial, the court was not
convinced that their mere existence proved that defendant intended to distribute the
child pornography and he was ultimately acquitted of those charges.'"
The multiuser system poses greater problems in determining the privacy issue.'47
According to one commentator, the threshold question is whether it is possible to have
a legitimate privacy interest in information distinct from "ownership or control of the
underlying storage media."'" It has been suggested that in order to have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in some types of data on a multiuser system, "the data must not
knowingly be exposed to other users of the system and the system manager's ability to
access the data must not constitute a disclosure" to a third party.49
This "nature of the system" approach focuses to some degree on the steps taken to
ensure a higher level of security than is regularly available. For example, scholars have
recognized encryption technology and passwords as valid methods to increase one's
expectation of privacy in various computer data." ' Understanding these security
measures is essential because extreme tension often emerges in this context between the
interest of law enforcement in prosecuting criminals and an individual's interest in
keeping his or her information private.
As stated above, the Fourth Amendment not only protects against unreasonable
"searches," but also guards against unreasonable "seizures."'5 ' In United States v.
Jacobsen," the Supreme Court held that a seizure of property occurs when there is
a "meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in that property."'"
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that the installation of a beeper in a container
did not constitute a seizure because it did not interfere with the defendant's possessory
interest in the container." Similarly, in Arizona v. Hicks,'" the Supreme Court held
that copying the serial number on an item of equipment did not interfere with the
owner's possessory interest, and thus was not a seizure."
144. See Steve Warmbir, Closing Loopholes for People Preying on Kids On-line, CHI. DAILY
HERALD, Aug. 9, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 23265684.
145. See id.
146. The defendant was found guilty on the lesser charge of "possession of child pornography" and
sentenced to probation and community service. Id.
147. See Sergent, supra note 5, at 1196.
148. Id. at 1195-96.
149. Id. at 1197.
150. See Note, Keeping Secrets in Cyberspace: Establishing Fourth Amendment Protection for
Internet Communication, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1591, 1603 (1997); see also Sergent, supra note 5, at 1199-
1200.
151. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
152. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
153. Id. at 113. Note that an arrest is generally viewed as a seizure of the person. See United States
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
154. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712-13 (1984).
155. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
156. See id. at 324-25. It must be noted, however, that the Court found that moving the equipment
to view the serial number was a "search." See id
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Defining a "seizure" in cyberspace, however, is much more problematic particularly
because the information contained therein is intangible." The Supreme Court has
provided some guidance in applying "seizure" analysis to intangible information in the
context of the telephone conversation, which may be instructive in determining the
appropriate approach to computer data. Citing Katz, the Court held that a wiretap
constituted a "seizure" of a telephone conversation."4 A unanimous Court has not
agreed upon this conceptualization of a conversation," and therefore questions
regarding when a seizure actually occurs in such a context remain problematic.
It has been suggested that Katz and Hicks might be reconciled by focusing on what
the possessory interest in the seized item actually is."6 For example, the possessory
interest in a conversation lies in controlling the dissemination and use of the
conversation, while the possessory interest in a tangible item consists largely in the
item's use. 6' Likewise, copying information from a document or tape recording a
conversation interferes with control and thus interferes with possessory interest; but
photographing a scene or copying a serial number from an object does not meaningfully
interfere with possession." Following this line of reasoning, a computer file is more
analogous to a written document or oral conversation, because the value of the file lies
in the information therein." Therefore, copying a computer file interferes with the
owner's possessory interest and should constitute a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. 6
3. Farewell to the Warrant Requirement?
The general rule is that once a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, a wanant
based on probable cause is generally necessary to effectuate a search or seizure. It has
been suggested that indiscriminate searches and seizures may be undesirable for either
or both of two reasons. First, warrantless searches expose completely innocent
people and their possessions to interferences by government when there is no good
reason to do so." Second, indiscriminate searches and seizures are conducted at the
157. See Sergent, supra note 5, at 1185. This author suggests that due to the intangible nature of
computer data, authorities can make copies without any interference with an individual's access; therefore,
it could be argued that no possessory interest is interfered with at all. See id.
158. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
159. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Justice Black dissenting stated that "[i]t simply
requires an imaginative transformation of the English language to say that conversations can be searched
and words seized." Id. at 78 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan also dissented, stating, "Just as some
exercise of dominion, beyond mere perception, is necessary for the seizure of tangibles, so some use of
the conversation beyond the initial listening process is required for the seizure of the spoken word." Id.
at 98 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
160. See Sergent, supra note 5, at 1186.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 126, at 411.
166. See id.
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discretion of law enforcement, who may act "despotically and capriciously" in the
exercise of their power to search and seize.67
In Johnson v. United States," the Supreme Court discussed the importance of the
search warrant:
The point of the Fourth Amendment ... is not that it denies law enfor-
cement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw
from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime."
In other words, where a warrant has been issued by a neutral magistrate it acts as
insurance that probable cause exists."'
Probable cause must exist for a valid warrant to be issued.' Probable cause
requires that there be some reasonable ground for belief in certain alleged facts.'"
Furthermore, even when a warrant is not required, a showing of probable cause is
generally necessary to ensure that a search or seizure was reasonable."
It is important to recognize that the "warrant clause" of the Fourth Amendment
contains a particularity requirement. Namely, the warrant must "particularly describ[e]
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."'" The particularity
requirement serves several broad policy goals. First, the particularity requirement makes
"general searches... impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another."'"5 Second, a valid warrant should be sufficiently definite so that
the executing officer can identify the property sought with reasonable certainty. 6
Finally, the particularity requirement is intertwined with the requirement that there be
probable cause to search." "The nature of the property will often give some
indication as to how detailed a description is necessary.""
167. See id.
168. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
169. Id. at 13-14.
170. Of course, probable cause represents the threshold of proof that must be satisfied before the
power to search and seize is legitimated. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
171. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 95, § 3.3(a), at 138.
172. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (6th ed. 1990).
173. See id
174. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
175. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192. 196 (1927).
176. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 95, § 3.4, at 161 (discussing the unrealistic standard set
forth in Marron that with the warrant "nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant").
177. See id.
178. Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, The Course of True Law Has Not Run Smooth, 1966
U. ILL. L.F. 255, 268. In other words, some property may be described generally due to its very nature,
"[blut if the items sought are of a kind generally found in various places, then there is a need to be more
specific." Id.
[Vol. 53:99
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol53/iss1/7
COMMENT
As the composition of the Supreme Court has changed, however, so has the Court's
interpretation of the warrant "requirement." Judicial decisions have vacillated "between
imposing a categorical warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness alone."'"
4. When a Warrant Is Not Required
Where one would normally have a reasonable expectation of privacy, there are
certain situations that give rise to exceptions to the warrant requirement. In Johnson,
the Court stated that "[tihere are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the
need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended
that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with."" Several of these
exceptions, such as searches incident to arrest,"' searches necessary to protect life,"
searches in hot pursuit," searches under exigent circumstances," and searches
conducted at the U.S. border," will rarely be applicable to investigations of com-
munication in cyberspace. Three other exceptions are important in this context,
however. In applying them to the computer media some interesting conceptual
extensions are evident.
First, when valid consent to search has been given, it generally has been accepted
that the search is reasonable even without a warrant or any articulable suspicion."
Provided that the consent was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, there is no Fourth
Amendment problem."' In cyberspace, the consent exception may be implicated in
one of two ways. First, if a sender of data consents to a law enforcement agent's
reading the communication, then no warrant is required." Suppose that an Internet
user is a member of a "closed" chat room (one requiring a password for access).
Obviously, if the user gives the password to a police officer, he has relinquished any
expectation of privacy in the information."' This will be the case even if the user was
not aware of the officer's identity." Once a person entrusts another with information,
he assumes a risk that the other will be an undercover agent."' This scenario is
problematic, in so far as other chat room participants may not know that the password
was given to anyone outside the chat group. However, courts are unlikely to
sympathize with an individual who places herself in such a predicament. Note also that
179. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991).
180. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
181. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-36 (1973).
182. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978).
183. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
184. See United States v. Arias, 923 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 840 (1991).
185. See United States v. Ransey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977).
186. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232-33 (1973) (holding that consent must be
voluntary, which is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances); see also Sergent, supra
note 5, at 1214-16 (discussing consent searches on "multiple-user computer systems").
187. See Scimeckloth, 412 U.S. at 232.
188. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 95, § 3.10, at 238.
189. See Keeping Secrets, supra note 150, at 1600.
190. See id,
191. See id.
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the Fourth Amendment does not preclude an officer from misrepresenting his
identity.191
Second, when the information has been disclosed to a third party with common
authority over it, consent by the third party is valid." According to United States v.
Matlock," the authority of the third party to consent is based on "mutual use of the
property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes."'95 In
Matlock the Court emphasized two requirements which would point towards "common
authority": (1) that the consenting party could permit the inspection "in his own right,"
and (2) that the defendant had "assumed the risk" that the co-user would permit a
search.'" One scholar has suggested that whether or not a system manager of a
multiuser computer network has the ability to consent to a search of files of its various
users should depend on how the rights of access and control are allocated between the
users and the systems manager.
Third, when the information is in plain view of outsiders, it is "not protected because
no intention" to keep it private has been exhibited; therefore, there has been no
search.' Because the Internet is freely accessible to almost anyone, to expect privacy
of information easily observable by the browsing public would be ridiculous.
Furthermore, to assert that law enforcement officers have less right to travel the Internet
is untenable. For these reasons, communications in cyberspace that are open to the
public should be treated under the "plain view" exception. Of course, the plain view
exception to a search does not necessarily mean that Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable seizures would be excused as well. The Supreme Court has said
that the plain view doctrine "authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to
a police officer" if his "access to the object" has a Fourth Amendment justification."'
It is important to recognize that the law as it applies to computer technology is still
in its infancy. Thus, it may be difficult to determine how the exceptions to the warrant
requirement will ultimately be applied. Whether courts will extend existing exceptions
or create new ones depends largely on policy. Perhaps the Johnson Court's statement
about "exceptional circumstances" could be viewed as a benchmark. For example, if
a warrant were required in all cases, the law enforcement system might be overbur-
dened or the warrant process could be transformed into a mechanistic routine,
sabotaging efforts to both protect privacy and combat crime. This premise supports the
conclusion that the warrant should be used on a selective basis to "prevent those police
practices that would be most destructive of Fourth Amendment values."'
192. See id.
193. See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 95, § 3.10, at 239.
194. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
195. 1l at 171 n.7.
196. id.
197. See Sergent, supra note 5, at 1214.
198. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 95, § 3.2, at 127.
199. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
200. Sergent, supra note 5, at 1208.
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V. Tenth Circuit Faces the Problem
The Tenth Circuit has on several occasions faced the problem of child pornography
and the Internet. The court has addressed a statutory challenge as well as several
constitutional attacks charging violations of the Fourth Amendment. While the current
body of case law dealing with these issues is limited, it is important to understand the
methods employed by the Tenth Circuit, as the future is sure to see more of such cases.
Furthermore, the treatment of the Internet in the context of child pornography will
undoubtedly shed light on the manner in which the Tenth Circuit will handle other
cyber issues.
A. Statutory Interpretation
In a relatively recent case, the Tenth Circuit dealt with a challenge to a conviction
under the CPPA. In United States v. Wilson," the defendant appealed his
conviction under the Act claiming that the jurisdictional element had not been met
in his case.' More precisely, the defendant charged that the prosecution failed to
prove the statutory requirement that the "visual depictions were produced using
materials that had been... transported in interstate or foreign commerce. '
In Wilson, the court took the opportunity to define the meaning of "materials" found
in the statute. The court chose to adopt a broad definition of the term holding that
"materials" are not confined to the "ingredients" of the visual depiction, but include
objects that are determined to give form or shape to the visual depictions. In
applying this definition to the defendant's case, the court found that indeed the
requirement had not been met.'
In Wilson, the defendant was convicted by a jury based on evidence contained on ten
computer diskettes. While the court agreed that the diskettes did travel in interstate
commerce (at least from the manufacturer to the defendant's home state), there was a
striking dissatisfaction with the case presented by the prosecution at the lower court.
The court noted that the prosecution failed on several points. First, the prosecution
201. 182 F.3d 737 (10th Cir. 1999).
202. See id at 740. Defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), which states
that
[a]ny person who knowingly possesses 3 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films,
video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction ... which was produced
using materials which have been mailed or... shipped or transported [in interstate or
foreign commerce], by any means including by computer, if- (i) the producing of such
visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct; shall be punished as provided in subsection
(b) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Supp. 1999).
203. Wilson, 182 F.3d at 740.
204. See id. (citing United States v. Bausch, 140 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 1998), where the defendant was
convicted under the same statute for taking pictures of two minor girls and the court found that the
camera which the defendant used was from Japan which satisfied the "materials" requirement because
it was shipped in foreign commerce).
205. See id. at 743.
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failed to show that the diskettes were actually used to produce the graphic files.
Second, while some of the images originated out of state and it was likely that the
defendant used his computer to download them, only one diskette out of the ten
contained such images and three or more were necessary under the statute.' Finally,
there was other evidence that some of the images were from German magazines, but
no explanation was provided as to how those images found their way on to the diskettes
in the defendant's possession.'
The Wilson decision illustrates the approach likely to be taken by the Tenth Circuit
when faced with the task of defining statutory language in this context. The court took
a very broad approach in its interpretation of "materials." Had it not been for the failure
of the prosecution to link the diskettes, or the files on them, to interstate commerce, the
court would have likely upheld the defendant's conviction.
B. Fourth Amendment Analysis in the Tenth Circuit
In United States v. Carey, the Tenth Circuit dealt with several Fourth
Amendment issues in the context of child pornography stored as computer data. In
Carey, the defendant was charged with possession of a computer hard drive that
contained one or more images of child pornography produced with materials shipped
in interstate commerce.!" The defendant appealed an order of the district court
denying his motion to suppress material seized from his computer, arguing that it was
taken as a result of a general, warrantless search. The Carey court agreed with the
defendant and reversed.
In Carey, the defendant was under investigation on unrelated drug charges for some
time prior to his arrest on child pornography charges. During the course of an arrest
at the defendant's residence, officers elicited verbal consent to search the defendant's
apartment and later received formal written consent.2 " During the course of the
search, the officers found drug evidence as well as two computers that they believed
would contain evidence of drug dealing.
After taking the computers to the police station, the officers obtained a warrant
permitting them to search for evidence of the sale and distribution of controlled
substances. During the search, a number of graphic files with sexually suggestive titles
were downloaded. The detective conducting the computer search began to view the
files and discovered child pornography. Ultimately, two hundred and forty-four such
files were downloaded and transferred to nineteen disks.
206. See id. at 742.
207. See id. at 744.
208. See id.
209. 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
210. See id. at 1270. Defendant was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Supp. 1999). See
Carey, 172 F.3d at 1270.
211. Defendant's written consent authorized "a complete search of the premises and property located
at 3225 Canterbury #10, Manhattan, KS 66503" and stated, "I do freely and voluntarily consent and agree
that any property under my control ... may be removed by the officers... if said property shall be
essential in the proof of the commission of any crime in violation of the laws of the United States."
Carey, 172 F.3d at 1270.
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The government analogized the computer search to looking for documents in a file
cabinet, pursuant to a valid warrant, yet turning up child pornography."2 They argued
that seizure of the images was permissible because a valid warrant was obtained
authorizing the search of any file that might contain evidence of drug crimes, and
because the images were in plain view.! Furthermore, the government maintained
that the defendant's consent to search his apartment extended to the search of all files
on both computers found within it.2"
The court rejected the government's arguments, finding that the files seized were not
authorized by the warrant and that the scope of the defendants consent to search his
apartment did not permit the opening of files found on the computers. First, in
addressing the warrant, the court stated that it allowed only the search of documentary
evidence pertaining to the sale of narcotics.2 5 Furthermore, the contents of the files
were not covered by the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement because the
contents could not be seen without first opening the files.2 The court stated that after
viewing the first graphic file, the investigating officer was then armed with probable
cause that the other files would contain similar depictions and should have sought a
warrant 2 "
Next, the court in Carey addressed the scope of the defendant's consent, finding that
it did not extend to the content of the graphic files." The court noted that the officers
were aware of this because a proper warrant to search for drug related evidence was
obtained prior to any computer files being opened.2"9 Since the files in question were
labeled as graphic in nature and contained sexually suggestive titles, after opening the
first one, the officer had reason to know what the others would contain.'
The opinion of the Carey court is important in several respects. First, the court's
decision focused intensely on established Fourth Amendment standards and refused to
condone the type of general searches against which those standards are designed to
protect. Second, the court's analysis serves as a guide to both officers and prosecutors
regarding what will be expected of them in the future. This is significant due to the fact
that the law as it relates to computer technology is constantly evolving and those
attempting to combat crime should know what will be required of them constitutionally.
Finally, the court in Carey addressed the analogy set forth by the government - that
images stored in a computer may be likened to files in a file cabinet. The court
recognized that this conception of computer files may be inadequate, and even warns
that analogies like this may lead courts to "oversimplify a complex area of Fourth
Amendment doctrines and ignore the realities of massive modern computer storage.'
'221
212. See id. at 1272.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 1272-73.
216. See id. at 1273.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 1274.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. Id. at 1275 (quoting Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data,
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This observation by the Tenth Circuit exhibits the quality of judicial restraint and
understanding that is so essential as society moves onto the Internet and increases its
computer usage.
In United States v. Simpson,22 a case decided prior to Carey, the Tenth Circuit was
again faced with Fourth Amendment challenges to a conviction for receiving child
pornography; this time, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).m The conviction was
based on images stored on computer files, which belonged to the defendant and which
were recovered by authorities during the execution of a search warrant.2 On appeal,
the defendant raised several Fourth Amendment arguments: (1) "that the search warrant
was improperly obtained and executed," (2) "that the court admitted improper evidence
and testimony," and (3) "that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.""
A review of the case highlights how the Tenth Circuit applied the Fourth Amendment
doctrines described above.
In Simpson, the defendant argued that certain evidence seized at his home and used
to convict him should have been suppressed. First, Simpson claimed that the search
warrant was invalid because the facts presented to the issuing judge were insufficient
to allow the judge to conclude that the evidence sought met the definition of child
pornography' under Oklahoma law.'m The affidavit presented to the issuing judge
generally described the material being sought as "child pornography" and contained a
statement by the affiant that he had received information from FBI agents regarding a
deal struck with the defendant over the Internet to swap pornographic materials!
The court found that the information was sufficient to create probable cause justifying
the issuance of the warrant.m
8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 104 (1994)). The court noted that "electronic storage is likely to contain a
greater quantity and variety of information than any previous storage method" and that "computers make
tempting targets in searches for incriminating information." Id.
222. 152 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1998).
223. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) provides:
(a) Any person who -
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials
which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by
computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for distribution in interstate or
foreign commerce by any means including by computer or through the mails, if -
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1999).
224. See Simpson, 152 F.3d at 1244.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 1246.
227. Child pornography is defined under Oklahoma law by 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1021.2 (Supp. 1999).
228. See Simpson, t52 F.3d at 1246. In addressing this claim, the court declares that the sufficiency
of probable cause is determined by looking at the "totality of the circumstances" and deciding if "there
is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Id.
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
229. See id.
230. See hL at 1246-47.
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Simpson also contended that there was insufficient evidence to support probable
cause to believe he actually possessed any illegal materials." The court found that
even though the transaction between the FBI agent and the defendant never took place
(because Simpson was fearful of sending pornographic materials through the mail), the
agreement between the parties made over the Internet provided sufficient evidence to
conclude that the defendant possessed illegal materials. 2 The court rejected the
defendant's emphasis on the fact that the agreement occurred anonymously over the
Internet because the defendant gave the agent his real name and address. 3
It is easy to accept that probable cause existed in the Simpson case mainly because
of the fact that the appellant was ultimately found to have pornographic images of
children stored in his computer files. However, a more thorough review of the facts of
the case raises significant doubts as to whether probable cause existed. It is striking that
the court admitted that the government's evidence was "almost entirely circumstan-
tial.' In essence, the affidavit for the search warrant in the case was built around
very little: a conversation in a chat room called "Kidsexpics" between an undercover
agent and an individual who said that his name was "B. Simpson" and admitted to
having child pornography, a proposed agreement to swap child pornography, and a
series of e-mail messages which culminated in the appellant backing out of the
agreement to tradeY5 These were all of the facts presented. There were no actual
pornographic images presented and no one could vouch for the fact that they actually
existed. Furthermore, that the appellant was the individual who engaged in the
conversation with the undercover agent in the chat room was not certain. Any person
could have used the appellant's e-mail address to send and receive messages.
In Simpson, the appellant analogized his computer disks and hard drive to "closed
containers."'  He argued that the government should be required to get a search
warrant specifically authorizing their search.' 7 The court rejected this analogy because
there was no authority supporting it. 8 The Simpson court's rejection of the
defendant's proposed analogy of computer disks and hard drive to closed containers is
comforting in a sense. The decision is in line with the Tenth Circuit's later opinion in
Carey. Hopefully, the hesitation in accepting analogies to more conventional media is
a signal that the Tenth Circuit is willing to engage itself in an examination of the true
nature of computer data.
VI. Privacy Concerns - Fourth Amendment Analysis May Yet Prove Sufficient
As noted in the introduction to this comment, the choices we make as a society with
respect to the treatment of Internet searches under the Fourth Amendment will
231. See id. at 1247.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. Id. at 1244.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 1248.
237. See id.
238. See id.
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inevitably affect other areas of life. For this reason, courts should not rule blindly
without regard to the way their decisions impact future generations. The law should
continue to act within carefully circumscribed limits to ensure that the quality of
freedom in our democratic society does not suffer unnecessarily in the name of
"fighting crime."
Globally, the concern over online security and privacy is central to public discourse
about Internet related issues. In the United States, the privacy debate is not new.
However, technology increasingly enables and enhances the ability to gather, store,
compile, search for and sort personal data. Over two hundred years ago, the founders
of our Constitution declared that privacy was "the right to be let alone."' Since then,
the Supreme Court has identified privacy rights arising from different parts of the
Constitution. But, to date, no high court rulings definitively and directly apply to the
complex privacy issues that are raised every time individuals log on to their computers.
Several commentators have questioned whether new privacy laws need to be enacted
to deal with the online environment, or whether privacy rights should be more
universally protected.' The debate is becoming more heated as Congress considers
enacting legislation that would limit the use of encryption technology to further the
goals of law enforcement."' This factor is troubling particularly because there are no
clear answers. Obviously, crime control is a legitimate government interest, but how
much privacy are we, as a society, willing to give up?
One commentator makes a philosophical argument regarding the degree of autonomy
that we, as individuals, desire to maintainm This idea is very important on a practical
level as well because the way in which the issues are addressed will influence the
degree of power that is handed over to law enforcement. The public discourse
surrounding how much of ourselves we are willing to expose will likely become a more
important political issue in the years ahead. Additionally, the courts will need to make
a balanced response to the issue in hearing the cases.
As one author notes, an individual's ability to limit the flow of personal information
has long been viewed as an essential step towards securing a healthy relationship with
the outside world. 3 Continuing this, the author argues that privacy should be defined
as selective control of access to information about herself or the group to which she
belongs.' With this power over information, an individual can dictate to some degree
how others viewed her, and how she wishes to interact with the world.' The
diminished level of control over personal information that an individual experiences
239. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (recognizing the
conditions the constitutional drafters deemed "favorable to the pursuit of happiness").
240. See Nicholas W. Allard, Privacy On-Line: Washington Report, 20 HASnNGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 511, 526 (1998).
241. See Weinberg, supra note 68, at 681.
242. See Adler, supra note 93, at 1119.
243. See id.
244. See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
245. See J.M. Balkin, What is Postnuodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1988 (1992)
("Our ability to provide or withhold aspects of our private selves preserves and constitutes our
autonomy.").
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when she is outside the home or office should be balanced by the existence of a
"private enclave where [s]he may lead a private life."'
There are a striking number of federal and state statutes that apply to aspects of
electronic communication and information technology. Statutes thus deal with the
interception and disclosure of electronic communicationsfu? the protection of
government maintained databases"2 a regulation of credit and financial reports, 9 and-
telemarketing, to highlight just a few. However, many commentators conclude that
there are few effective safeguards that protect personal data online, that there are gaping
holes in existing laws, and that many existing laws are inconsistent, if not contradic-
tory.2
51
Furthermore, the possibility of developing the Intemet-wide search technology
discussed supra? is very real indeed and raises numerous concerns beyond the scope
of this comment. Clearly, however, such action by the government would constitute
unprecedented intrusion into the private lives of individuals. While traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis has yet to prove itself a perfect fit to current and future problems
involving the Internet and electronic data in general, it is the best that we have.
By supporting Fourth Amendment protections, both government and individuals are
ensured the healthy pursuit of their interests, which at times may conflict. Government
should not be permitted an unqualified entrance; individuals' lives should remain their
own.
VII. Conclusion: Moving Towards a Healthy Future Under
the Existing Fourth Amendment Model
Thomas Paine warned that the "avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty"
because it pushes a nation "to stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of
laws."'a Paine's concern is very real. There is a threat to liberty when legal
principles, which are outdated or ill-fitted to deal with a particular problem, are applied
by force. This comment uses the problem of child pornography on the Internet to
illustrate the difficulties in applying existing Fourth Amendment analysis to Internet
communications generally. This comment focuses on child pornography precisely
246. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414 n.12 (1966) (quoting United States v.
Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956)).
247. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
248. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 89 Stat. 1057 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
249. See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also Financial Institutions Regulatory & Interest Rate Control Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12.U.S.C.).
250. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2395
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
251. See Robert O'Harrow Jr., Laws on the Use of Personal Data Form a Quilt With Many Holes,
WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1998, at A12.
252. See supra text accompanying note 106.
253. Paine, supra note 1, at 588.
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because there is virtually universal dedication to the task of apprehending and
convicting individuals who trade in child pornography. In other words, it should be an
easy case. However, the case is not so easy, in the sense that we are still required to
look at the implications of applying existing Fourth Amendment models to a situation
with which it appears at times to be struggling to adapt.
As illustrated supra, the "expectations test" is an imperfect mechanism with which
to deal with many of the new Fourth Amendment issues. First, one's subjective
expectation of privacy in Internet communications will depend on the amount of
technical knowledge that one possesses about the Internet in general, and is thus
rendered somewhat meaningless. Who is the "average Internet user"? Does he or she
know about encryption technology? Do they use it? Does the average Internet user
know which types of computer data are more vulnerable to being uncovered? These
questions are difficult to answer.
Second, the "objective" prong of the test, or what society is willing to recognize as
"private," suffers the same fate. What does society want the limits on government
action to be? Should this determination be left up to the courts who appear to be
struggling to find an analogy buried in precedent?
In the interest of forwarding democratic ideals, it is essential that the courts carefully
adapt this model to current problems. Judges and lawyers alike must be sensitive to the
implications of all decisions made. They must strive to interpret the laws with liberty
and justice as their highest goals. While fighting crime is important, it is not so
important that the law should cease to develop concomitant to society.
The words of Justice Brandeis are worth reflecting on for their timeliness as well as
their success in expressing the sense of immediacy with which the issues discussed in
this comment should be addressed by those in the legal community:
Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill,
it teaches the whole people by its example .... To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means - to declare
that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction
of a private criminal - would bring terrible retribution.'
Amy E. Wells
254. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 468 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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